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Abstract. This article analyses the judge's role as an impartial subject in criminal proceedings. Lithuania's legal system belongs to the 
Romano-Germanic system characterised by the inquisitorial model of criminal process. However, the prevailing constitutional doctrine 
that separates the procedural functions of criminal procedure and jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court obliges the judge to seek to 
establish the strict truth by giving him/her a procedural tool – namely, an obligation to be active and act impartially. To reduce the 
possible misuse of judicial discretion, the law establishes the factors that limit it and ensure impartiality, including imperative procedural 
rules, the obligation of motivation for a judgment, the instance system of courts, and the system of guarantees ensuring the judge's 
independence. 
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Introduction 
 
Herbert L. A. Hart noted that "in any legal system there will always be certain legally unregulated cases, in 
which on some point no decision either way is dictated by the law and the law is accordingly partly 
indeterminate or incomplete" (Hart, 1997, p. 417). The aspiration is for legal disputes to be resolved in a way 
that people accept the final judgment as just, because the perception that justice has been done is important for a 
variety of reasons, such as obedience to laws (Petkevičiūtė-Barysienė and Valickas, 2016, p. 20). As noted in the 
doctrine, a just judgment lies not at the intersection of flexibility and rigour, but is a matter of the degree of 
flexibility. However, the choice of power for the judge is not absolute and is always associated with procedural 
constraints, such as impartiality, and subjective limitations, such as rationality (Barak, 2006). Procedural rules 
are established to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, and to prevent state representatives, including 
judges, from abusing their powers and acting arbitrarily. This is because judges may be inclined to distance 
themselves from the source of their authority, and substitute their public standards with their own (Gumbis, 
2004, p. 45).  
 
In Lithuania today, there is an attempt to "bring the court closer to the people". The aim of this idea is to make 
the courts more open to the public by, for example, expanding access to hearings for journalists; in addition, a 
push is being made for judges to comment on the motives for their judgments and means are being sought of 
increasing the somewhat low confidence in courts. In such an environment, ensuring effective judicial 
impartiality (although it has not yet lost its impartiality) is highly relevant because judges do not live in isolation, 
being influenced by the social environment and its norms. This creates a risk that the opinion of certain groups in 
society presented in the media may unacceptably affect judges in the decision-making process, giving rise also 
to the risk of aiming to please the public to gain their confidence. 
                                                 
1 Lecturer. Mykolas Romeris University, Law School, Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure. 
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This study examines the judge's role with respect to impartiality in the Lithuanian constitutional model of 
criminal process, as well as guarantees for ensuring their duty to remain impartial. This is considered in light of 
the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Supreme Court of Lithuania 
(hereinafter SCL) and legal doctrine2.  
 
1. The role of the judge in the Lithuanian constitutional model of criminal process 
 
Several classifications of types (models) of criminal process are outlined in doctrine for criminal procedure law. 
Almost all specialists in this area contend that there are several types characterised by certain principles and 
associated procedural forms (Ažubalytė et al., 2014, p. 13). 
 
Theoretical models of criminal process provided by various authors and the basis for their differences and main 
features are very similar in nature, differing only in areas of emphasis and names of process types (Ažubalytė et 
al., 2014, p. 16). The theoretical types (models) that can be distinguished in scientific literature are: models of 
crime control and fair trial, with respect to objectives of criminal law and proceedings3; and ancient accusation, 
medieval inquisition and adversarial processes, as well as certain variations of these models, such as private and 
public contesting, when comparing the specifics of relations between an individual and the state from a historical 
perspective4. We can also identify a distribution of criminal process models based on the intensity of repression, 
with regard to repression of trust (authoritarian) and distrust of it (liberal) (Pradel, 2001, p. 118).  However, what 
became predominant was a distribution of these models into contest and interrogation types, based on the nature 
of investigation of criminal offences and examination of cases, as well as the attribution of a mixed model to 
them5. According to the authors, the adversarial process for criminal proceedings prevails in countries 
characterised by the Anglo-Saxon (common law) system, as opposed to the Romano-Germanic legal system, in 
which preference is given to the interrogation system (Pradel, 2001, p. 117). The latter classifications will 
therefore be respected in this article, with the general features typical of these process types discussed in relation 
to the role of judges and their powers6. 
 
The most prominent feature of process under the adversarial model is the judge's assumption of a passive role, a 
factor that determines the other specifics of this process. The consolidation of the court as an impartial arbitrator 
is the background to the entire process: the court only passively observes the dispute between parties to the 
proceedings (with those parties the most active in the process (Ambos, 2003, p. 4)) and is not permitted to 
initiate the proceedings. The judge presiding over the case can summarise the facts examined, present his/her 
own assessments, issue instructions that are not compulsory for the jury to follow, and prevent questions being 
addressed to witnesses that are outside the confines of the case7. The court is not liable for seeking the strict truth 
during the adversarial process, but is only obliged to provide the parties to the proceedings with the opportunity 
and conditions for investigating the circumstances of the case during the trial (Аbramochkin et. al., 2010, p. 54).  
 
                                                 
2 The case law is presented in this work using a large number of excerpts, so as to avoid ambiguities and uncertainties, with 
the aim of familiarising the reader more widely with the circumstances of cases to give them a more comprehensive 
overview. 
3 For more information, see (Packer, 1968, p. 154-158). 
4 For more information, see (Smirnov, 2000). 
5 For more information, see (Goda et al. 2005; Kalinovsky, 2002). 
6 It is interesting to note that the concept of a judge as the performer of the legal role who lacks the power to create law, but 
exercises the sovereign's will and seeks counsel elsewhere is typical of the Romano-Germanic legal tradition. Under this 
system, a judge acts as an important but non-creative clerk in performing his or her functions, unlike judges in the Anglo-
Saxon legal system, where becoming a judge means the culmination of one's career, here judges are more respected, more 
creative and considerably more powerful. For more information, see (Machovenko, 2013). 
7 For more information, see (Pradel, 2001, 366-368). 
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Meanwhile, a feature of the inquisitorial process that differentiates it from the adversarial process is that the 
judge instead has an active role. This process is most often criticised for this reason, based on the argument that 
it leads to the judge losing impartiality and often becoming the accuser along with the prosecutor (Goda, 1999). 
The court has a duty to critically evaluate the evidence provided by the parties and, if necessary, perform 
procedural actions. Under the inquisitorial process, it is no longer an observer in this process, but the sole "host" 
of the trial (Smirnov and Kalinovsky, 2004). The aspect of the judge's professionalism is emphasised in legal 
doctrine when examining the role of the judge in the process of an inquisitional type (Gutsenko, 2005) because 
when hearing the case and passing a verdict, he/she must use a large amount of mastery to establish the truth 
(Ramanauskas, 2005, p. 51). The aim of establishing the material truth of a case determines such a role for the 
judge (Beulke, 2010, p. 3).  
 
However, it is emphasised in the doctrine that the process models are only theoretical and necessary to 
emphasise certain features typical of the process, such as defining the purpose of criminal proceedings and 
revealing common aspects; they cannot be treated as opposites (Pradel, 2001, p. 118; Packer, 1968, p. 154). 
Streaming itself shows the predominance of ideal procedural features, with the ideal typology based on abstract 
logical process constructions that do not have an analogue in real life (Vandyshev, 2010, p. 641). It is therefore 
possible to talk about a pure adversarial or pure inquisitorial process only as about abstract theoretical ideas, 
because the positive processes contain elements attributed both to the adversarial and investigative models; in 
other words, the positive process is between due process and the crime control process (Ažubalytė, 2009, p. 
515).  
 
In the 20th century, constitutionalisation, internationalisation and Europeanisation of ordinary law took place in 
democratic European states. Researchers of comparative criminal procedure law have noted that many states 
have defined such different procedural forms in their laws that it has become impossible to tell which features of 
the theoretical models – of the contest or the interrogation – dominates in the criminal procedure of the specific 
state (Ažubalytė, 2008, p. 41, with reference to Rau, Countries in Transition: Effects of Political, Social and 
Economic Change on Crime and Criminal Justice. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice, Vol. 7/4, 1999, p. 435). However, an opinion is supported here that despite the convergence of criminal 
procedure systems based on different models, the impact of the historically established model on modern 
criminal procedure law remains (Ažubalytė et al., 2014, p. 17), whereas the perception and interpretation of the 
purpose of modern procedure is mainly determined by the imperatives of the Constitution and international 
human rights (Ažubalytė, 2009, p. 522).  
 
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the Constitutional Court)  
recently formed a constitutional doctrine, which consolidated the constitutional concept8 of the general criminal 
process model (Jurgaitis, 2009, p. 39). An analysis of this allows the interpretation (without contradicting the 
doctrine of criminal procedure law) that the current law has never been "pure" and contains features of both 
models (Ažubalytė, 2002, p. 64, with reference to: Foinitsky, 1996, p. 61; Viktorsky, 1997, p.15). However, 
Lithuania belongs to the Romano-Germanic legal system, meaning that the investigative (inquisitorial) side of 
the process is more prevalent in its criminal procedure (and when analysing the latest jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court, it can be cautiously stated that it has recently become increasingly evident)9. 
 
It is interesting to note that back in 1999, the Constitutional Court held that the court could not be active, stating: 
"The court's requirement provided for in the norms of the CCP [Code of Criminal Procedure] for the 
interrogator or the questioning authority, after having acknowledged that the preliminary investigation is, in 
essence, incomplete, for the submission of new evidence allows the assertion to be made that specific functions 
                                                 
8 The constitutional model of criminal procedure will be considered in this work only in so far as it relates to the role of the 
court (judge) in it. 
9 There are cases in which the Lithuanian criminal process model is attributable to the mixed model; for example, see (Goda 
et al. 2005). 
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are provided for the court. When the court or the judge instructs the interrogator or the questioning authority, 
corresponding procedural relations arise between these institutions, that may be a cause of concern for the 
court. Thus, preconditions for doubting whether the court, applying these norms, is an impartial arbitrator, are 
created. It must be noted that in such cases the judge himself/herself may find it more difficult to objectively 
assess the circumstances of the case" (Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 5 May 
1999). However, it also said that although “the Constitution does not provide for the court to rule on the merits 
of the case, taking guidance only from the evidence provided by the parties, and cannot show any initiative in 
this area – as already expressed in the expert opinions presented in the same ruling of the Constitutional Court – 
it is necessary to seek to establish the material truth in a criminal procedure for dealing with cases, without being 
limited to establishing the formal truth. If, in such a situation, the court sees that it is necessary and possible to 
obtain new evidence to establish the material truth in the case, but does not take any measures to do so , this 
would represent not the administration of justice, but a refusal to administer justice. [...] The requirement of the 
court to provide new evidence does not mean that the prosecutor is deprived of the function of controlling the 
activities of the questioning authority and the interrogator. The court demands the provision of new evidence to 
properly fulfil its obligation to justly resolve the case. It is incorrect to state that the requirement of the court to 
submit new evidence is equivalent to exercising control over the activities of the questioning authorities and 
interrogators, also because the content of the concept of control is different and more diversified." (Ruling of the 
Constitutional Court of 5 February 1999). 
 
The court's position expressed in the ruling cited above was not taken into account in the new CCP, because the 
developers of the CCP implemented the idea of an active court. In doing so, they considered the position 
expressed by the Constitutional Court that the analogous legal regulation can be regarded as appropriate in 
another system of criminal procedure norms. The developers adhered to the position that the Constitutional 
Court was more focused in its ruling on the traditions of Anglo-Saxon rather than continental law when 
interpreting the principle of the court's impartiality and treated the active actions of the court as a violation of 
impartiality (Goda, 2011). 
 
Ultimately, the Constitutional Court's position set out in the ruling of 5 February 1999 was reinterpreted. As 
stated in the doctrine, such a revision can be explained firstly by the necessity of ensuring the principle of the 
right to a defence, and secondly by a need to create conditions for the proper administration of justice so fair 
judgments are made (Goda, 2011, p. 86, with reference to Kūris, 2009, p. 141). 
 
In its ruling of 8 May 2000, the Constitutional Court drew attention to the following perspective: "The 
constitutional function of the court – the administration of justice – is fundamentally different from that of 
leading the pretrial investigation of a case, the control of the investigation, the maintenance of public 
accusation, etc. When administering justice, the court examines the already prepared criminal case, decides on 
the guilt of the defendant, and imposes a sentence or acquits him/her. On the other hand, the court and the 
judge, when administering justice, are not bound in the course of pretrial investigation [...] by the collected 
evidence: the constitutional duty of the court is to fully, completely and objectively examine the whole case and 
make an equitable judgment10." In developing this doctrine, the Constitutional Court further detailed the role of 
the judge as follows: "The rule of law states and the principles of justice presuppose such a model of the court, 
as the justice-administering institution, so that the court cannot be understood as a "passive" observer of 
proceedings and the administration of justice cannot depend only on the material submitted to the court. In 
order to objectively and thoroughly examine all the circumstances of the case and establish the truth of the case, 
                                                 
10 The Constitutional Court has also pointed out that constitutional value does not comprise the adoption of a judgment itself 
in court, but the adoption of a just judgment. The constitutional concept of justice presupposes not a formal, nominal 
exercise of justice by a court, nor the external appearance of justice administered by the court, but such court judgments 
(other final court acts) that are not incorrect from the point of view of their content. On its own, the justice formally 
administered by the court is not the justice that is enshrined, protected and defended by the Constitution. See Rulings of the 
Constitutional Court of 21 September 2006, 25 September 2012 and 8 May 2014. 
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the court has the authority to carry out procedural steps itself or to entrust the performance of the appropriate 
actions to certain institutions (officials), inter alia to prosecutors" (Ruling of the Constitutional Court of 16 
January 2006). This finally, therefore, establishes the status of the Court as an active subject in the criminal 
process11.  
 
To help prevent doubts about the weaving of functions and strengthen the role of an active and impartial judge, 
along with his or her duty to establish the strict truth in a case, the Constitutional Court has stated: "The 
Constitution, inter alia the principles of the rule-of-law state, justice and division of powers enshrined in it, 
presupposes that the court, when giving the above-mentioned orders, must act in such a way as not to create 
preconditions for believing that the court is biased. It must be emphasised in this context that the court, when 
giving an order to carry out a pretrial investigation or perform separate procedural steps (which cannot be 
performed in court), must not specify how such an order is to be executed, what the desired result is, etc.” 
(Ruling of the Constitutional Court of 16 January 2006). 
 
In analysing the tendencies of the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence, it has been noted that the role of the court 
as an active participant in criminal proceedings is increased by providing it with additional powers to properly 
carry out its constitutional function. For example, the norm of the CCP in the ruling of 15 November 2013 was 
acknowledged as contrary to the Constitution, insofar as it does not state that the court may, under its own 
initiative, substitute the factual circumstances of the offence referred to in the accusation with substantially 
different ones. The possibilities have also been expanded for the court to requalify the offence referred to in the 
accusation in accordance with criminal law, providing for a lighter crime or offence in which different or new 
features of the offence or other circumstances relevant for qualifying the offence are stated. On 26 June 2017, 
the Constitutional Court recognised that Paragraph 4, Part 1 of Article 326 of the CCP, insofar as it does not 
establish the powers of the court of appellate instance – after having ascertained that the factual circumstances 
fundamentally differ from those established by the court of first instance and that this may lead to a significant 
worsening of the situation for a sentenced or acquitted person, or a person whose case was terminated – to refer 
the case back to the court of first instance for examination is in conflict with the Constitution. In this case, the 
Constitutional Court has interpreted the limits of two fundamental principles of appeal – non reformatio in peius 
and tantum devolutum quantum appellatum. As stated in a Council of Europe recommendation, in the event that 
only the accused person appeals against a judgment, the principle of reformatio in peius prohibition must be 
taken into account. The explanatory memorandum of the recommendation also states that it is fundamentally 
wrong to impose a more severe punishment if the complaint is lodged only for the purposes of the defence. 
Injustice can arise not only from unexpectedness (when the prosecutor has not lodged a complaint), but also 
from deterrence of the accused from their right to appeal against a judgment (Recommendation No. R (92) 17 of 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 19 October 1992 regarding consistency in the 
imposition of sentences (Part F of the Annex)). However, without disregarding the importance of these 
principles and the limitations imposed on them, the Constitutional Court  held that the current legal regulation12 
did not create the preconditions for the court to make a fair judgment in cases and properly administer justice 
(Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 26 June 2017). 
                                                 
11 Being guided by Constitutional jurisprudence, the SCL also keeps to analogous positions, noting that "the right of a 
person that his/her case would be publicly and fairly examined by an independent court, the rule of law and the principles of 
justice presuppose such a model of the court, as the justice-administering institution, that the court cannot be construed as a 
passive observer in the proceedings and that the administration of justice cannot depend solely on what material is provided 
to the court; in order to objectively and thoroughly examine all the circumstances of the case and to establish the truth 
therein, the court has the power to carry out procedural actions itself or to instruct certain authorities to perform the relevant 
actions (...)." Supreme Court of Lithuania case No. 2K-7-398/2013. 
12 According to this, the court of appeal instance, after examining new evidence or evidence that has already been examined 
by the court of first instance that could lead to a conclusion that the facts differ substantially from those established by the 
court of first instance and that may lead to a worsening of the situation for a convicted or acquitted person, or a person 
whose case is terminated, and being restricted by the non reformatio in peius and tantum devolutum quantum appellatum 
principles of criminal procedure law, does not have the power to refer the case back to the court of first instance. 
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However, it should also be noted that the general concept of the administration of justice has been formed in the 
constitutional jurisprudence, in which not only the pursuit of material justice (the adoption of a fair decision) but 
also the procedural exercise of justice (strict adherence to procedural rules) has been formed (Ažubalytė, 2014, 
p. 152-153): "The constitutional concept of administering justice also implies that courts must deal with cases 
strictly in accordance with procedural and other requirements established by law and within the limits of their 
jurisdiction, and other powers (Rulings of the Constitutional Court of 16 January 2006 and 24 October 2007). 
The duty to examine cases in a fair and objective way, and take motivated and reasoned decisions arises for the 
courts out of Part 1 of Article 109 of the Constitutions (inter alia Rulings of the Constitutional Court of 15 May 
2007, 17 September 2008, 31 January 2011 and 25 September 2012). The principle of justice consolidated in the 
Constitution, as well as the provision that courts administer justice, means that the constitutional value is not 
decision-making in court, but the adoption of a fair decision by the court;  the constitutional concept of justice 
implies not only the formal, nominal justice administered by the court or the external appearance of justice 
administered by the court, but – most importantly – such judicial decisions (other final court acts) that are not 
incorrect from the point of view of their content" (Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Lithuania of 15 November 2013). The convergence and concord of material and procedural justice is therefore 
necessary, because the impartiality of judges is required for the proper safeguarding of procedural justice. 
Procedural justice in this case can be described as the conformity of dispute resolution techniques or procedures 
and the behaviour of the person performing it to certain standards, factors that determine whether the parties to 
the dispute will perceive both consideration and final settlement of the dispute to be fair (Justickis and Valickas, 
2006, p. 96). 
 
The prevailing doctrine on constitutional criminal procedure and the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence 
separating the procedural functions (a feature of the adversarial model)  therefore oblige the judge to attempt to 
ascertain the real truth (a feature of the inquisitorial model) by providing him/her with a procedural tool – 
namely, the duty to be active (inquisitorial model) and implement his/her duty impartially (adversarial model).  
 
2. The duty of the court in ensuring impartial proceedings 
 
The importance of the judge's impartiality is highlighted in international law. As stated in Article 10 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, everyone, on the basis of complete equality, has the right to have 
his/her case publicly and fairly examined by an independent and impartial tribunal, thus establishing his/her 
rights and obligations and the reasonableness of the accusation against him/her. Article 6 (1) of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms establishes the right of everyone to 
have his/her case properly examined within the shortest possible time under conditions of equality and in public 
by an independent and impartial tribunal constituted in accordance with law. Resolution No. 40/32 of the United 
Nations General Assembly of 29 November 1985 and Resolution No. 40/146 of 13 December of the same year, 
together comprising the "Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary", should also be mentioned.  
 
Paragraph 2 of Article 31 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Paragraph 5 of Article 44 of the 
CCP also establish the right of an individual charged with a criminal offence to have his/her case publicly and 
fairly examined by an independent and impartial tribunal. However, when interpreting the content of the 
principle of impartiality, it should be noted that the case law is not limited only to guaranteeing this right for an 
individual, but that the court must be impartial to all participants in the proceedings (Supreme Court of Lithuania 
in criminal cases No. 2K-16-489/2017 and No. 2K-96-489/2018). This principle is therefore perceived in the 
broadest sense as a guarantee for the participants in the proceedings that the criminal case will be tried in a court 
that does not have or express any prejudices with regard to the participants (Supreme Court of Lithuania in 
criminal cases No. 2K-243/2009 and No. 2K-16-489/2017). Such a position is also confirmed by Article 47 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which states that "Everyone is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law" 
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(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2016/C 202/02). This principle means that when a 
criminal case is being investigated and examined, the parties to the proceedings must be equally treated so that 
those conducting the process are not liable to make a decision that is unfairly favourable to one of the parties, 
nor would otherwise make any assumptions that call into question the objectivity of their activities (Jurka, 2009, 
p. 78). At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that the court has a duty to use all opportunities during 
criminal proceedings to establish the truth in a case and make a fair judgment about a person's guilt (or 
guiltlessness) in committing an offence (Jurka, 2009, p. 100), as well as about other issues being examined in the 
case. To help establish the truth, the court must actively participate in criminal proceedings, including defining 
the limits of the hearing, carrying out certain procedural steps, preventing individuals from abusing their rights, 
and resolving other issues important in hearing the case (Jurka, 2009, p. 103). This is necessary because, as 
already mentioned, the court is the "host" of the trial. This gives rise to the question: how can the impartiality of 
the court be ensured when implementing the tasks assigned to it? 
 
A separate chapter titled "Removal" is devoted to the CCP impartiality assurance institute. As pointed out in the 
doctrine, the Institute of Removal is a procedural institute tasked with ensuring that during the examination of a 
case, participants in the proceedings with an interest in the outcome are unable to influence the decision-making 
process (Commentary on the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, Parts I-IV (Articles 1-
220), 2003, p. 158). The system of provisions of the institute of Removal established in Articles 57-61 of the 
CCP leads to the dual implementation of the principle of impartiality in criminal proceedings. This principle is 
implemented firstly by ensuring the rights of the participants in the proceedings, defending their legitimate 
material interests and challenging the removal of relevant subjects in the proceedings under consideration by the 
court (or judge); and secondly, with respect to relevant subjects, including the duty of the court (judge) to 
abolish them (Articles 59-61 of the CCP) provided for by law (Jurka, 2009, p. 78). The purpose of the principle 
of impartiality, as stated in the doctrine, is therefore to not only prevent further involvement of the relevant 
subjects in the criminal case who are interested in its outcome, but also to foresee in advance a priori that such 
an interest may sooner or later arise (Jurka, 2009). 
 
The requirement for the court to maintain impartiality, as consolidated in Part 1 of Article 6 of the ECHR, gives 
an individual charged with a criminal accusation the right to express any doubts that he/she might have about the 
court's impartiality and to demand that these are properly assessed – and implies an obligation for the judge, ex 
officio, to be proactive. [...] The Convention establishes a certain obligation for the court in corpore and for each 
judge individually to control itself/himself/herself to ensure that the public and the accused trust them and 
ultimately the procedural decision they arrive at (Merkevičius, 2010, 76, p. 71). It is interesting that, according 
to Robert Esser, the ECHR relates the obligation to remove oneself from a hearing to the requirement of 
objective impartiality. This duty is not an integral part of subjective impartiality (Esser, 2002, p. 554). 
 
In this respect, the ECHR singles out the court's obligation to be proactive by making public the grounds known 
to it for which it may be regarded as biased and to remove itself at its own initiative so as not to participate in the 
proceedings. Another important element in this proactivity is the court’s duty to actively investigate with due 
consistency and care, and reasonably evaluate those circumstances raised in relation to objectively justified 
doubt by the accused or his/her defender, unless the doubts expressed by the participants in the proceedings are 
clearly unjustified (Remli v. France, 1996). The ECHR interprets the concept of court impartiality not only 
autonomously, but also in a fairly broad way (Merkevičius, op. cit. p. 69, with reference to Esser, 2002, p. 539; 
Villiger, 1993, p. 243). It devotes particularly close attention to the judge's appearances and does not evade the 
wording: "Justice must not only be done; it must also be seen to be done" (Campbell and Fell v. the United 
Kingdom, 1984; Castillo Algar v. Spain, 1998; Padovani v. Italy, 1993; Piersack v. Belgium, 1982; Thorgeir 
Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 1992). Emphasising the importance of impartiality, the ECHR has noted that the right to 
an independent and impartial trial is so prominent that it cannot be sacrificed for expediency (Teixeira de Castro 
v. Portugal, 1998).  
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As already mentioned, court bias refers to a prejudicial attitude or disposition in favour of one of the parties and,  
conversely, to the detriment of the other party involved in proceedings – something that is predetermined by 
definite factual circumstances or a definite situation (Merkevičius, 2010; Villiger, 1993, p. 245). As clarified in 
the case law of both the European Court of Human Rights and the national courts, the requirement for 
impartiality involves two aspects: firstly, the court's duty to be subjectively impartial means that when it comes 
to court proceedings and exercising the obligation to be proactive and establish the strict truth, the judge cannot 
personally, for any reason, have a predetermined approach or be tendentious towards one of the parties in the 
case; and secondly, the court must be impartial in an objective sense – in other words, it must ensure at any stage 
of the proceedings that the parties involved are treated equally and fairly without being given any additional 
guarantees, privileges or "legal" favours, and the court must provide sufficient guarantees to eliminate any doubt 
arising about possible bias, especially when it takes active steps (Orders of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in 
criminal cases No. 2K-414/2010, No. 2K-306-895/2016, No. 2K-340/2008, No. 2K-176/2010, No. 2K-
193/2010, No. 2K-187/2011, No. 2K-132/2015, No. 2K-7-124-648/2015, No. 2K-102-222/2016, No. 2K-162-
697/2016; Daktaras v. Lithuania, 2000; Micallef v. Malta, 2009). According to the CCP, the court is always 
recognised as biased when a case has been examined by at least one judge who should not have participated in 
the proceedings for the reasons listed in Article 58 of the CCP, which can be divided into factors leading to 
subjective and objective bias: family or kinship relations (intuitu personae) between the judge and participants in 
the proceedings (par. 1 of part 1 of Art. 58 of the CCP); the interest of the judge himself/herself or his/her family 
members or relatives in the case's outcome (par. 3 of part 1); participation of the judge in performing different 
functions in the same case (par. 2 of part 1 and par. 1 of part 2); the solution of issues related to the application 
of a coercive procedural measure (par. 2 of part 2); and examination of the same case for the second time (par. 3 
to 6 of part 2) –  for the sake of interest, it is worth mentioning (but without going into details due to the scope of 
this work) that in this final case the norm does not refer to the prohibition of the judge from examining the same 
case several times in the court of cassation, but as was noted by the SCL: "A complete list of circumstances in 
which the judge should not participate in the examination of a case is provided in part 2 of Article 58 of the 
CCP" (Orders of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in criminal case No. 2K-27/2006). It is evident that the 
regulation is not exhaustive or consistent and it is difficult to discern the procedural basis by which the cassation 
instance is singled out from other instances. In the event that such a situation occurs, nothing remains in light of 
such imperfect regulation but to use paragraph 4 of part 1 of Article 58 of the CCP, which provides that the 
judge should not participate in the proceedings if those involved cite other circumstances that raise reasonable 
doubts as to the impartiality of the judge. Unfortunately, this case does not solve the problem of the imperative 
or specific obligation of the judge to dismiss himself/herself in the event of the situation cited. In such a case, the 
judge should not ignore the duty to take a proactive approach as foreseen by the ECHR and should implement 
this – in other words, disclose any grounds known to him/her on which he/she may be considered biased and, if 
necessary, on his/her own initiative withdraw himself/herself to not take part in the proceedings. At the same 
time, the duty arises for the other participants in the proceedings (officials) to take all measures required under 
law (in this case, to withdraw themselves if deemed necessary) so that the hearing process is fair and honest. 
ECHR case law should also be mentioned in this context (despite the fact that this is largely related to the actions 
of the judge at the pretrial stage), under which the provision is respected that a judge presiding over a case who 
has previously taken decisions related to the same offence cannot in itself be regarded as a circumstance that 
justifies fear of a lack of impartiality. In this case, the nature of the earlier decisions is important (Marguš v. 
Croatia,  2014), but the issue of lack of impartiality does not arise if the judge previously made only formal 
procedural decisions in criminal proceedings and neither the evidence was assessed nor the position on the fault 
of the accused (the essence of the case) expressed when making them (Gómez de Liaño y Botella v. Spain, 2008; 
Bulut v. Austria, 1996). However, the most important thing to keep in mind is that the prohibition on double 
examination of the same case is intended to ensure that the composition of each court in any instance is 
completely impartial and will not have any prejudice or preformed opinion before the case is examined. 
 
The court's duty to take a proactive approach is not directly related to any grounds for bias in proceedings, but 
such action may make one of the parties view the court as biased and appearing to lean towards support of the 
other party. When assessing whether the court is impartial in fulfilling its constitutional obligation to establish 
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strict truth in a criminal case, the problem therefore arises of discerning when the court is only carrying out its 
duty to be proactive and when certain court actions must be regarded as going beyond the impartiality threshold. 
This type of situation often arises in judicial practice, whereby violations of procedural requirements made by 
the court are also viewed by participants in the proceedings as court bias.   
 
As stated in the doctrine, in acting proactively or refraining from certain actions, a court can demonstrate bias 
via any procedural or even non-procedural action or decision, regardless of whether the action was performed in 
the courtroom or outside it (in the broadest sense). Court bias can, for example, be detected in the verdict of an 
accusatory court,  an order to reject an accused person's request for the collection of factual data (such as by 
questioning a certain person as a witness, assigning an expert examination or requesting a document), questions 
addressed by the judge to the accused or witnesses, the court's conduct when hearing the defendant's lawyer (for 
example, if remarks are addressed to the defendant "not to adhere to the theory or to the copybook maxims")  
and in the court's organisational actions (for example, not allowing the accused to make an audio recording of a 
hearing) (Merkevičius, 2010, p. 94). A court's conduct can also lead to objectively justified doubt with regard to 
bias if, for example, a judge undertakes to carry out not only the administration of justice or the management of 
a court hearing (and maintenance of order in the court), but also a prosecutor's function (Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. 
Iceland, 1992) – thus violating the adversarial principle (Kansal v. UK, 2004; Vermeulen v. Belgium, 1996). 
Under this, the parties must have the opportunity to not only provide evidence to help substantiate their claims, 
but also the right to be made aware of and comment on all the evidence and observations submitted to influence 
the judgment (attention should be drawn to the fact that judges themselves are obliged to respect a trial's 
adversarial principle, especially when they reject a complaint or settle a dispute on the basis of their own reason 
(Vermeulen v. Belgium, 1996; Skondrianos v. Greece, 2003; Clinique Des Acacias Et Autres v. France, 2006). 
 
It should also be noted, however, that the principle of impartiality cannot be understood too broadly. When 
analysing the case law, it was observed that as the role of an active judge (as a process entity) grows stronger, 
cases occur in which highly unjustified doubts arise about the court's (non) bias when acting.   
 
Taking into account that any bias of the judge (of the court) that relates to an internal state of mind or moral and 
ethical standpoint is difficult to prove from both a positive and negative point of view (a presumption of the 
court's impartiality exists), the ECHR analyses certain objectively expressed circumstances deemed sufficient to 
assess the court's impartiality (Padovani v. Italy, 1993). It draws the conclusion that the basis for talking about 
court affiliation or bias only relates to objectively justified doubt, whereas the subjective fear, distrust or concern 
on the part of the accused cannot be considered to be that (Fey v. Austria, 1993; Vera Fernandez-Huidobro v. 
Spain, 2010; Order of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in criminal case No. 2K-74-976/2017; Merkevičius, 2010, 
p. 69, with references to Villiger, 1993, p. 245; 19; 26; 37; 43). The SCL maintains an analogous position, 
indicating that: "The parties' opinion is insufficient for stating that there is an infringement of the requirement of 
impartiality, and it must be determined whether there are any circumstances demonstrating that the court has an 
interest in making a judgment that is favourable to one of the parties in the proceedings. A convicted (accused) 
person's opinion about whether there is a justifiable basis in a particular case for doubting that the specific 
judge is lacking in impartiality is important, but not decisive. The most important factor is whether such a doubt 
can be considered justified" (Order of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in criminal case No. 2K-74-976/2017). In 
the absence of specific indications of court bias in a particular case, a statement of bias must not be based solely 
on the fact that the court was active – as reflected in the following quote from a case: "The court of first instance, 
having reasonably found that there are grounds to believe that the deed specified in the charge can be 
requalified (Part 2 of Article 256 of the CCP), when renewing the investigation of the evidence in court (Part 2 
of Article 300 of the CCP) and informing the participants in the hearing of this possibility, did not show its bias, 
as the aim of renewing the investigation of evidence was to ensure compliance of the process with the provisions 
of Article 31 of the Constitution, Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Articles 7, 10 and 44 of the CCP, not to violate the procedure for changing the 
qualification of the deed specified in Article 256 of the CCP in court and to ascertain the position of the victim 
E. P. regarding the possibility to reconcile with D. J. The panel of judges of the court of cassation instance, 
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having not found other data on bias or prejudice on the part of judge D. Domeikienė and having not specified 
any such data to the cassator, has no reason to draw the opposite conclusion" (Orders of the Supreme Court of 
Lithuania in criminal case 2K-77-942/2017 of 21 March 2017; Zand v. Austria, 1978; Crociani and others v. 
Italy, 1980; Cooper v. UK, 2003; Dupuis v. Belgium, 1988).  
 
The actions or inaction of the court, both active and passive, identified by participants in proceedings as raising 
doubts about impartiality can be fairly well divided into two groups13: the first comprises actions of the judge 
directly related to organisational and structural decisions, as well as decisions and/or actions that determine the 
course of the process; and the second consists of court actions directly related to participants in the process (such 
as satisfaction of their requests).   
 
Examples of a judge's actions that can give rise to accusations of bias directly relating to organisational, 
structural and procedural decisions and/or actions include errors made by the court when interpreting and 
applying the law (Supreme Court of Lithuania in criminal cases No. 2K-122/2010, No. 2K-243/2009), an 
incomplete and inappropriate layout of some of the evidence relating to the verdict, a laconic analysis of the 
evidence submitted in the verdict, the violation of requirements raised with regard to the descriptive part of a 
guilty verdict (Supreme Court of Lithuania in criminal cases No. 2K-177-942/2017, 2K-468/2014, No. 2K-
316/2006), a demand by the chairman of the court addressed to the accused persons to maintain appropriate 
discipline and respect the court during a hearing (Supreme Court of Lithuania in criminal case No. 2K-
361/2006), the admission of a guilty verdict (Supreme Court of Lithuania in criminal cases No. 2K-144/2007, 
No. 2K-168/2003, No. 2K-708/2003, No. 2K-361/2006, No. 2K-142/2007, No. 2K-314/2007), and examination 
of the case of a co-accused person (Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013). Such cases, however, do not 
in themselves provide sufficient grounds for stating that a court examining a case is biased, and the 
circumstances must be carefully evaluated. The ECHR has noted that "the mere fact that a judge has already 
dealt with a co-accused person's case is not in itself sufficient to cause doubt about the impartiality of this judge 
in the applicant's case, but in such a case it is necessary to verify whether anything was actually spoken about in 
advance in relation to the possible guilt of the defendant in the previous judgments. It is also taken into account 
whether an independent assessment of the circumstances of the case is provided in the second conviction, 
including whether it contains references to the previous conviction, whether the applicant is mentioned in the 
first conviction, and in what form and context. The ECHR states that a professional judge is more likely to be 
dissociated from his/her previous experience in the related case than an unprofessional judge or jury is" 
(Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013). 
 
Compliance with the principle of court impartiality requires the process to be organised in such a way that no 
impression is created that greater favour is manifested to one of the parties during its course (Supreme Court of 
Lithuania cases No. 2K-122/2010, No. 2K-198/2009). Judges must listen to persons involved in a process and 
respond to their arguments in a way required by law, being equally attentive to each of the participants. It is 
common for cassators to point out that the court has been demonstrating its bias when unfavourably solving 
issues raised by one of the parties. However, an analysis of case law allows it to be stated that there is also not 
sufficient basis alone for stating that the court is biased in circumstances such as the adoption of a judgment 
unfavourable to a party in the proceedings (Supreme Court of Lithuania case No. 2K-144/2007), the assessment 
of evidence in a manner not desired by a party involved in the process, the opinion of a person that evidence has 
been assessed inappropriately or they disagree with the court's conclusions (Supreme Court of Lithuania cases 
No. 2K-495/2014, No. 2K-248-895/2015, No. 2K-401/2012, No. 2K-491-303/2015, No. 2K-477-746/2015, No. 
2K-162-697/2016), the rejection of requests submitted by participants in the process (Supreme Court of 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that with regard to impartiality, it is only a matter of the court's  deliberate action / inaction, as impartiality is 
perceived as a kind of inner state that is linked to the prejudice or preconception of the court in favour of one of the parties to the 
proceedings, or vice versa. Any court bias found is therefore absolute grounds for the nullity of a verdict, as an essential infringement of 
criminal procedure and one that cannot be remedied by a court of higher instance. Unconscious court actions or inaction should be 
otherwise assessed in the context of criminal proceedings (for more information, see (Rimšelis, 2008; Rimšelis, 2006). 
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Lithuania case No. 2K-409/2006), or decision-making considered unfavourable to the defence (multiple and 
even in violation of the provisions of the ECHR) (Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, 2013).  
 
Meanwhile, a panel of judges should not discuss any issues with the participants in proceedings, nor moralise or 
express indignation at a court session or when passing a judgment or ruling, as this may create preconditions to 
reasonably doubt the court's impartiality (Supreme Court of Lithuania cases No. 2K-751/2007, No. 2K-
202/2005, No. 2K-16-489/2017). It is also important that there is nothing in the judgments that reveals a 
particular attitude of the court towards the participants in the process. Here, it is appropriate to mention an SCL 
ruling that detailed how critical remarks by the appellate court on the evaluative nature of requests expressed by 
the prosecutor in the court of appeal instance, as well as his access to the case and other deficiencies in the work 
of the prosecutor's office – including court and prosecutor actions relating to the omission and renewal of the 
time limit for filing an appeal that, in general, did not fall within the limits of the court of appeal's jurisdiction – 
went beyond the objective criteria of court impartiality. The court of appeal instance, which was found to be 
biased, stated in its order that: "The panel does not discern any objective reasons, only subjective ones, such as 
inaction by the prosecutor. The initiation of the official inspection, 'established' vague procedure, bad 
organisation of work or irresponsibility cannot be attributed to objective reasons that prevented timely lodging 
of the appeal"; "the pretrial investigation into the individual, who did not commit any crime, went on for more 
than three years because of unlawful and unfounded procedural decisions made by prosecutors, the pretrial 
investigation judge and subsequent courts. As a result of this, J. K. was found to be a suspect and coercive 
procedural measures were applied to him later on without J. K's right to a fair trial having been ensured after 
the accusation was made, and he then acquired the procedural status of the accused and was tried; even when 
filing an appeal, the prosecutor's office was not able to avoid violating the Criminal Procedure Law, which 
proves the prosecutors' biased approach towards this case, with an inability to properly perform the functions 
assigned to them by the Constitution and laws" (Supreme Court of Lithuania in criminal case No. 2K-16-
489/2017). 
 
It is appropriate to note the opinion that the primary and most important purpose of the court should be the 
aspiration to protect the accused and thereby provide him/her with the possibility of rehabilitating 
himself/herself into society. Only after having recognised such a role for the judge can the parties in the 
proceedings be equal (Merkevičius, 2009, p. 149, with reference to Mizulina, 1992, p. 59-61). However, it needs 
to be held that there is no big difference in whether the court takes the prosecutor's or defence's side, because in 
both of these situations an interest in the outcome of the case does not allow the final decision-maker (the court) 
to properly implement the objective of criminal procedure – namely, establishing the strict truth. 
 
Analysis of the case law makes it possible to draw a cautious conclusion that it is hard to imagine it is feasible to 
create a model that would help assess any bias on the part of the judge (or court) that may arise from the court's 
duty to be proactive and establish the strict truth in a case. This is particularly evident when taking into account 
that the powers of the judge to act proactively are wide, from the possibility of changing the qualification of the 
criminal offence to the right to stop the final speech. It is assumed that the requirement for judicial impartiality 
will not be violated if the court is active as long as is necessary to ensure the rights and requirements of the 
parties in the proceedings (such as the adversarial principle) – in particular, if the parties are unable to defend 
these requirements – as well as the purpose of the criminal proceedings. It is therefore necessary to accept that 
the impartiality of the court can be recognised without discussing or asking what the judge thinks or wants at a 
specific time or stage of the proceedings, but instead by assessing the direction and intention of the judge's 
procedural behaviour defined by their externally (objectively) expressed actions and decisions (Merkevičius, 
2010, p. 94).   
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3. Guarantees to help ensure the impartiality of judges in fulfilling their duty to act actively 
 
It is not denied in the doctrine that there may be abuses of judicial power, as with any other type of power. A 
judge needs to acknowledge that this power is intended only for the proper performance of court function – and 
with their knowledge of law and what powers are granted to him/her, must also understand the limitations set for 
him/her as a judge (Barak, 2006, p. 299). A judge needs to maintain a balance between change and the 
requirement for stability, given that stability without change signifies degeneration, whereas changes without 
stability signify anarchy. The judge's role is to aid the convergence of the needs of the legal system and society, 
and prevent the system from degrading or descending into anarchy. In other words, he/she needs to ensure 
stability in the course of changes and changes at stability (Barak, 2006, p. 299). In this case, it is necessary to 
accept the statement that "The duty of the judge to be an arbitrator does not allow him/her to be a fighter. [...] 
Nevertheless, there are cases – and, of course, there should be – in which the judge properly performs his/her 
functions, ignoring the prevailing consensus of the public and becomes a "standard bearer" for a new consensus 
in society." (Barak, 2006, p. 297). 
 
The activity of the court in proceedings is connected not only with the broad discretion granted by the legislator 
of the court for performing certain actions, but also with the proper regulation of the law14. This position is based 
on the fact that the legislator cannot create the rules or propose a variant solution for each definite case. The 
court is therefore granted the exclusive right to administer justice, whereby a certain freedom of manoeuvre and 
discretionary rights are necessary for it to fulfil this function (Jurka et al., 2009, p. 104). However, discretion 
should not be perceived as necessarily leading to a legitimate choice – in other words, a decision that is made 
within the limits of existing restrictions (Richardson, 1983, p. 20-21). The essential advantage of discretion is 
negative with respect to the rules of court, being associated with the fact that the rules have drawbacks and do 
not always function properly (Gumbis, 2004, p. 42). 
 
In the doctrine, attention is drawn to the fact that although judges tend to believe they decide cases by taking into 
account the specific circumstances of each case, social laws act objectively – meaning that similar cases are dealt 
with in a similar fashion in different jurisdictions at various stages of the judicial process. As Cardozo has 
pointed out: "There is never a complete, unrestricted and non-diverted freedom. We are surrounded and 
restricted by thousands of limitations, some of which are laws, some precedents, some the result of unclear 
traditions or methodology of immutable times, even when we imagine ourselves to be acting completely freely. 
The mysterious power of professional opinion suppresses with its atmosphere, though we do not feel its weight. 
Any freedom granted to us is, at best, narrow" (Gumbis, 2004, p. 42).  
 
The nature of limitations is highly diverse, and these can emerge from rules, precedents, traditions and for other 
objective or subjective reasons (Gumbis, 2004, p. 47). Judges are, for example, restricted by the social 
environment – given that decision-makers do not live in isolation – and can be hindered by various personal 
factors such as laziness, unwillingness to assume responsibility or the desire to avoid repetitive reasoning. Of 
course, they are also restricted by their previous training because the education they receive ingrains them with 
certain thinking that provides the framework for guidelines or decisions, or even leads to a standard way of 
thinking (Gumbis, 2004, p. 48). As far as limitations are concerned, it is also important to keep in mind that an 
essential condition with respect to the judge's professionalism (particularly in processes of an inquisitorial type) 
is his/her inner conviction in the perception of his/her profession as a vocation for administering justice 
(Navickienė, 2015, p. 196). According to Weber, when performing their function (including the obligation to be 
active), judges must not only have certain qualities but also passion for their role. This helps provide them with 
intuition and a willingness to take responsibility for administering justice, both of which are necessary in their 
profession. Intuition is perceived as the ability to "calmly and having gathered one's thoughts allow reality to 
exert its influence and, thus, the distance in relation to things and people". Developing this quality, according to 
                                                 
14 The activity involved in developing the law will not be considered in more detail in this article. 
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Weber, allows the infusion of "both a hot passion and a cold mother wit into the same soul" (Weber, 1990, p. 
51). The principle of impartiality means that when passionately seeking justice and, as stated by Valančius, 
maintaining sensitivity to the problems of a particular individual, the judge must remain impartial in relation to 
the actual material and witnesses, and must depart from his or her own convictions, sympathies and anxieties, as 
well as feelings (Navickienė, 2015, p. 196). To maintain impartiality, a judge also needs to consider the parties 
to a dispute to be equal and give them equal opportunities to lead their cases, while the judge must not gain any 
personal benefit from the case. At the same time, impartiality signifies objectivity, meaning that judgments are 
made on the basis of circumstances external to the judge, and that may even be contrary to his/her personal 
convictions. The judge must respect the values recognised by society, even if they are not shared by him/her, and 
must express what is considered moral and just in the society in which they operate – even if they do not 
perceive it as such from their subjective point of view (Barak, 2006, p. 296). However, ideas raised by schools of 
legal theory on theological, naturalistic, realistic, sociological and other types of factor that help ensure the 
impartiality of judges while they carry out their obligation to be proactive will not be further discussed in this 
work. An attempt will be made to examine factors that limit the judge and ensure their impartiality through the 
prism of the current legal requirements of criminal procedure. Essential factors that, according to the author of 
this work, limit the discretion of the judge and ensure that his/her activity does not become biased, will therefore 
be further reviewed here. 
 
Imperative procedural rules are the most obvious limitations on discretion and, at the same time, something 
that helps to ensure impartiality. In particular, these rules specify aspects such as the nature of the action to be 
taken and who should be notified of these actions. If in making a specific decision, the judge complies with all 
mandatory rules, the judgment is more likely to be fair. This means that any potential abuses are therefore 
limited by the setting of specific rules for the subject, such as the decision that is to be made in the presence of 
the aggregate of concrete facts (Gumbis, 2004, p. 50). For example, as provided in part 2 of Art. 301 of the CCP: 
"A guilty verdict cannot be based solely on the testimonies of victims or witnesses, who are subject to the right 
to anonymity. It is possible to justify a guilty verdict via testimonies by these persons only if these are supported 
by other evidence." However, when analysing the compliance of a judge's behaviour with procedural justice, 
attention has also been paid to the fact that this depends on how requirements are formulated in procedural law: 
judges' behaviour has been seen to be more in line with the requirements of the justice system in situations that 
incorporate detailed regulation compared with when these situations are unregulated (Petkevičiūtė-Barysienė and 
Valickas, 2016, p. 22). It must, however, be borne in mind that the growing positivisation of law has certain 
negative aspects, with the paradox that this makes it possible to gradually get closer to legal nihilism 
(Berkmanas, 2012, p. 47-48). 
 
Another factor that limits the possibility for abuse of the discretion available and helps ensure the impartiality of 
judges is the obligation to provide motivation for a judgment because this means that when issuing a 
judgment in writing, the judge explains his/her position on a particular issue.  
 
As noted in the legal doctrine, proper, reliable and correct legal reasoning is a guarantee contained in the 
constitutional rights of an individual – comprising the principles of equality before the law, and the right to a fair 
and impartial trial and an appropriate legal process (Baltrimas and Lankauskas, 2014, p. 39). The requirement to 
motivate judgments helps to ensure that judgments made by the court, as a state authority, in the name of the 
Republic of Lithuania will be substantiated; it also helps ensure implementation of the principles of publicity of 
court hearings, the parties' right to be heard (audiatur et altera pars), and the expansion and development of law 
(Trumpulis, 2007). Furthermore, irrespective of whether a statement itself is admissible and valid, the 
correctness of a decision in a practical situation is determined by the correctness of arguments that serve as a 
basis for its application (Bernal, 2011). Proper motivation to strengthen the protection of human rights is an 
important and valuable legal objective that can justify changes in court practice (Trumpulis, 2007, with reference 
to Administrative case No. P17-44/2006 (S) V. T. v. General Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Lithuania). 
Meanwhile, opinions appear in the legal doctrine of Lithuania that the way the verdict is written depends to a 
large extent on the judge's dexterity and ingenuity: under this thinking, for example, a clever judge who is 
Rasa ŽIBAITĖ – NELIUBŠIENĖ  
International Comparative Jurisprudence. 2019, 5(1):87-107. 
 
 
100 
 
confident about a particular fact or decision will always find something to justify (motivate) the procedural 
documents (Merkevičius, 2009, p. 138, with reference to Schmitt, Die richterliche Beweiswürdigung im 
Strafprozess, S. 206-215, 217-228).  
 
The importance of providing a motivation for judgments is also emphasised in the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania (Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Lithuania of 21 September 2006), in which it is stated that the final court act must contain sufficient arguments 
to justify this act; it must also not contain unnamed arguments or unspecified circumstances that are important 
for the adoption of a fair final court act; and, furthermore, the final court act must be clear to the parties involved 
in the case and other persons. Attention has also been drawn to the fact that drawing up the final court act before 
it is formally adopted and publicly announced is one of the legal guarantees that justice will be enforced in the 
case – otherwise, a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the judgment may arise. To ensure the proper and 
qualitative implementation of the duty to state reasons, the Lithuanian Council of Judges stated in a ruling that: 
"It must be obvious from the motives for a judgment that the court has a position on all the accepted evidence 
and on all the issues arising in the case. However, this does not mean that it needs to be comprehensively and 
broadly spoken in every aspect. The duty of the court to give reasons for its judgments cannot be perceived as a 
requirement to give a detailed answer to every argument. Sometimes it is enough to give a very concise 
motivation. A detailed motivation is not necessary when responding to arguments that are manifestly irrelevant, 
unfounded, abusive or unacceptable for other reasons, in light of the clear provisions of the law or the 
established case law regarding arguments of an analogous nature. The reasons for a judgment cannot be mutually 
exclusive. Having sufficient reasons to make a judgment, first of all, means that the essential questions of the 
case must be clearly answered. It must be clear from the motives of the judgment which aspects of the case have 
been disputed and which ones have not been, and therefore, the motives for a judgment are usually drawn up 
taking into account the relevant issues" (Ruling No. 13P-65-(7.1.2) of the Judicial Council of 27 May 2016 "On 
the approval of recommended standards for the quality of procedural judicial decisions"). 
 
When assessing whether there have been any violations of the Convention, particularly in the context of the 
impartiality of the court, the ECHR also gives particular attention to the importance of motivation of judgments: 
"The chairman of the panel of judges, after having announced the verdict of the court of first instance, publicly 
stated that the parliamentary investigation and the media campaign did not prevent the judges from remaining 
objective and impartial. […] the verdict in the case was made following a trial procedure based on the 
adversarial principle, during which the applicant had the possibility to submit his arguments, useful for the 
defence, to the courts, while the reasoning of the judgments does not give grounds for stating that the judges, 
when assessing the evidence, could have been influenced by speeches of the members of the commission" (Blesa 
Rodriguez v. Spain, 2015).  
 
The instance system of courts is considered no less important a guarantee in helping to avoid manifestations of 
judicial bias. The Constitutional Court has held that "the purpose of the instance system of the courts of general 
jurisdiction is to create preconditions for the courts of higher instance to correct any errors in fact-finding (i.e. 
errors in ascertainment and assessment of legally significant facts) or any errors in law (i.e. in the application of 
law), which for some reason may be made by the court of lower instance, and to prevent the occurrence of 
injustice in any civil or criminal case, or case attributed to the other category that has been examined by the 
court of general jurisdiction; otherwise, it would deviate from the constitutional principle of the state under the 
rule of law, and an individual's constitutional right to due court proceedings would be violated; the 
aforementioned correction of errors of the courts of lower instance and stopping injustice related to it are a 
conditio sine qua non for the parties in the respective case and for society in general with regard to trusting not 
only in the court of general jurisdiction that examines the relevant case, but also in the whole court system of 
general jurisdiction (inter alia, rulings as of the 28 March 2006 and the 15 November 2013)" (Ruling of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 26 June 2017). The Constitutional Court has also noted: 
"The law must establish such legal regulation that the final act of the court of general jurisdiction or of the 
specialised court of first instance established pursuant to Part 2  of Article 111 of the Constitution could be 
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appealed against to at least one court of higher instance. [...] the legislator has the discretion, by keeping to the 
constitutional principle of the state under the rule of law, to determine to which court and under what procedure 
an individual can apply for the protection of his/her violated rights and freedoms. At the same time, it needs to 
be emphasised that, according to the Constitution, the legislator cannot establish such legal regulation 
according to which an individual, regardless of his/her legal status, cannot apply to a higher court with regard 
to his/her violated rights, otherwise his/her rights would be restricted" (Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Lithuania of 27 November 2006). 
 
The ECHR has also noted the importance of proper implementation of Article 2 of Protocol 7 to the ECHR, 
which provides for the right to review a judgment. The right to review a guilty verdict may be related to both 
factual circumstances and legal acts, or only to violations of law. Certain procedural limitations are also possible 
for reviewing a judgment, but this right must be directly accessible to the interested parties and must be 
independent from any discretionary actions of the authorities – and the right to review a judgment must not 
violate the essence of the law (Papon v. France, 2002; Pesti and Frodl v. Austria, 2000; Zaicevs v. Latvia, 2007; 
Galstyan v. Armenia, 2007; Gurepka v. Ukraine, 2005; Krombach v. France, 2001). 
 
As noted in legal doctrine, pursuant to Part 5 of Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and Article 2 of Protocol 7 to the ECHR, a sentenced person has the right to insist that a higher-instance 
court reviews a judgment. However, the ССP provides much wider possibilities for appeal, with all parties 
concerned in proceedings able to file their appeals on any grounds and motives (Jurka et al., 2009, p. 49). 
 
The instance system of courts – or, in other words, the system of forms for controlling judgments15 –  is an 
internal tool for court control aimed at ensuring the validity and legitimacy of a judgment and correcting any 
errors made. The judicial control function helps the constitutional functions of the judicial authority to be 
realised (Randakevičienė, 2009, p. 175-176). The instance system of courts is not characterised by hierarchical 
subordination. It is acknowledged that a court of higher instance is usually superior to a court of lower instance: 
firstly, it has more experienced judges with a longer record of service and cases are handled collectively; 
secondly, the workload of a court of higher instance is lower, allowing more attention to be devoted to the case; 
thirdly, courts of lower and higher instance are more restricted, and the checking of a case in the court of higher 
instance makes it possible to ensure the principle of impartiality to a higher degree; and fourthly, the function of 
interpretation of the law and unification of case law occurs in a court of higher instance (Randakevičienė, 2009, 
p. 180).  
 
Although Part 4 of Article 33 of the Law on Courts establishes that the courts of lower instance, when making 
decisions on cases attributed to the relevant categories, are bound by the rules of the courts of higher instance for 
the interpretation of laws that have been formulated in analogous or substantially similar cases, and Article 386 
of the CCP points out that a court of lower instance must follow the instructions of the cassation court when re-
examining a case, the Constitutional Court has pointed out that the instance system of the courts of general 
jurisdiction cannot be interpreted as restricting the procedural autonomy of the courts of lower instance of 
general jurisdiction: the courts of higher instance of general jurisdiction (and judges of those courts) cannot, for 
instance, interfere with cases that are being examined by the courts of lower instance of general jurisdiction, and 
cannot give them  any mandatory instructions or guidance on how to deal with the cases concerned. Meanwhile, 
such instructions (irrespective of their binding or recommendatory nature) are to be considered in the context of 
the Constitution as relating to the functioning of the respective courts (judges) ultra vires (Ruling of the 
Constitutional Court of 28 March 2006; Ruling of the Constitutional Court of 9 May 2006). The practical 
problems involved in harmonising these provisions are illustrated by a case in which the Judicial Court of 
Honour fined a judge on the basis that she constantly and deliberately ignored the instructions and practice of the 
                                                 
15 Ordinary and extraordinary forms of control for judicial decision-making are distinguished in the science of criminal procedure law. 
For more information, see Randakevičienė, I. Forms of control of the judicial decision-making in the criminal proceedings. In Fair 
criminal proceedings: Problematic issues. Vilnius: Industrus, 2009. 
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court of higher instance, and dealt with cases without giving regard to one of the tenets of law – court precedent. 
But having examined the judge's complaint, the SCL adjudged that "having assessed the fact that there was no 
uniform case law in the court of higher instance on this particular procedural issue, there is no legal basis for 
acknowledging that the judge, having failed to fulfil the order of the court of higher instance, has roughly and 
manifestly violated procedural law" (Order of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 19 November 2015 GT1-
1/2015 (S)). 
 
There are opinions in Lithuanian legal doctrine that "[...] the stage of the trial does not bear the role that 
determines the whole criminal process and its results – this has long been taken over by the pretrial 
investigation. The legislator in the criminal procedure forgot the purpose of the court as a neutral arbitrator and 
forced the court to take the stance of accusation" (Merkevičius, 2009, p. 137), while "[…] today's pretrial 
investigation not only determines the further trial, but even more so, the independent proving disappears in the 
trial: the court, after having read the written documents submitted to it at the trial hearing and examined the 
tangible evidence, and after having heard the speeches and arguments of the participants in the proceedings has 
no other method than simply to 'sanction'  the factual data provided by the accuser and acknowledge the 
probative power of these data that the accuser assigned to them during the pretrial investigation. The court is 
incapable of either effectively filling in the gaps in the pretrial investigation or correcting the errors made in the 
initial stages" (Merkevičius, 2009, p. 144).  However, it is difficult for the author of the current study to accept 
this position, as otherwise we would simply assume that all judges perform their duties freely and that the 
existing legal systems do not provide judges with the ability to properly fulfil their duties, which is something 
they try to rebut when analysing the system of guarantees. 
 
One more important factor that helps to ensure the court's impartiality should therefore also be highlighted: the 
system of guarantees that ensures the judge's independence (his/her obligation to remain independent). 
The Constitutional Court has held that when analysing the principle of independence of judges and courts, it 
must be noted that independence is not a privilege but one of the most important duties of the judge and of the 
court, arising from the right guaranteed by the Constitution for an individual to have an independent and 
impartial dispute arbitrator (Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 12 July 2001; 
Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 6 December 1995; Ruling of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 18 April 1996; Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Lithuania of 19 December 1996 On the compliance of Articles 5 and 10 of the Law of the Republic 
of Lithuania on State Secrets and Their Protection with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania as well as 
on the compliance of Rulings No. 309 and No. 310 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 6 March 
1996 with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with norms of the Code of Civil Procedure of the 
Republic of Lithuania; Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 5 February 1999; 
Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 21 December 1999; Decision of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 12 January 2000 On the elucidation of the Ruling of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 21 January 1999). Meanwhile, the principle of 
independence of the judge and courts set out in the Constitution implies that the legislator has the duty of 
establishing a body of guarantees ensuring such independence to ensure the court's impartiality in the decision-
making process and prevent interference with the activities of the judge or the court in the course of 
administering justice (Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 21 December 1999). 
The Constitutional Court has held that "according to the way in which independence of the judge and the court 
established in Part 2 of Article 109 of the Constitution is elaborated in the laws, the guarantees of independence 
of judges can be conditionally divided into three groups: a) the guarantee of inviolability of the duration of the 
judge's mandate; b) the guarantee of immunity of the judge's personality; c) guarantees of a social (material) 
nature for the judge". These guarantees are closely interrelated, so it is therefore universally acknowledged that 
the breach of any of the guarantees of independence of the judge and the courts can be detrimental to the 
implementation of justice – in which case there would be a risk that human rights and freedoms would not be 
guaranteed (Ruling of the Constitutional Court of 12 July 2001). 
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When analysing the independence of the court within the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, much 
attention is devoted to the legal status and qualifications of the judge, as well as the situation with regard to 
prohibitions on influencing or interfering with the court's activities. It is namely these guarantees of 
independence that are necessary and directly related to the possibility for the court to remain impartial when 
performing its duty. 
 
The specific function of the court entrenched in the Constitution, with the principle of independence of the judge 
and courts, also determines the judge's legal status. Judicial power is formed not on a political basis, but on a 
professional one: "The judge according to his/her duties performed cannot be attributed to public servants and 
he/she cannot be required to pursue any policy. The judicial practice is formed only by the courts themselves, 
applying the rules of law" (Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 21 December 
1999). The judge's duties are not compatible with other duties or other work. The established prohibition is 
aimed at ensuring the independence and impartiality of judges – necessary conditions for the implementation of 
justice (Ruling of the Constitutional Court of 12 July 2001).   
 
Another aspect of independence relevant to the proper administering of justice by the courts is the qualifications 
of judges: only people with a high legal qualification and life experience can be appointed as judges, meaning 
that they are held to specific professional requirements. The proper preparation of judges, with a deepening of 
their knowledge and upgrading of their qualifications is an important precondition for ensuring the proper 
functioning of the courts. Aside from this, judges are expected to meet extremely high ethical and moral 
standards, with an impeccable reputation and a commitment to preserving the honour and prestige of their 
profession (Ruling of the Constitutional Court of 27 November 2006). The ECHR has also drawn attention to the 
fact that the judge's qualifications are an important factor with respect to his/her impartiality and helping to 
avoid external influences – for example, "professional judges deal with the issue of criminal charges because 
their vocational training and experience allow them to ignore any external influence" (Abdulla Ali v. the UK, 
2015). 
 
As stated in Part 1 of Article 114 of the Constitution, "interference of the state authorities and governing 
institutions, members of the Seimas and other officials, political parties, political and public organisations or 
citizens with the activities of the judge or court is prohibited and imposes a liability under the law". The 
prohibition of interference with the activities of the judge or court is intended to ensure their independence. The 
court can administer justice only if the judge is able to deal with the case impartially, taking into account the 
circumstances of the case and the requirements of the law (Ruling of the Constitutional Court of 12 July 2001). 
When administering justice, all judges have an equal legal status from the point of view that unequal guarantees 
of the judge's independence when administering justice (deciding cases) and his/her autonomy cannot be 
established. No administering judges can be subordinate to any other judge or chairman of any court (inter alia 
the court in which he/she works, as well as the court of higher chain or instance) (inter alia, Rulings of the 
Constitutional Court of 27 November 2006, 29 June 2010 and 14 February 2011). The judge must not detail the 
cases he/she is considering to any public authority or officials. The procedural independence of the judge is a 
compulsory prerequisite for the impartial and fair examination of a case (Ruling of the Constitutional Court of 
21 December 1999).  
 
As the Constitutional Court points out, the system for guaranteeing independence for judges and courts does not 
create any preconditions under which the judge is able to avoid properly carrying out his/her duties or would 
negligently handle cases, unethically treat people participating in a case, or violate human rights or dignity. 
Meanwhile, it has also been pointed out that the system of self-regulation and self-governance of the judicial 
authority must be suitable for ensuring that judges properly carry out their duties, with any unlawful or unethical 
behaviour by a judge being properly assessed (Ruling of the Constitutional Court of 12 July 2001). 
 
These fundamental guarantees ensure the impartiality of the judge (of the court) when performing his/her (its) 
duty to act proactively, as well as reduce the risk of misuse of the court's discretion.  
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Conclusions 
 
1. Although the legal system of Lithuania belongs to the Romano-Germanic system characterised by the 
inquisitorial model of criminal process, the prevailing constitutional doctrine of criminal procedure and the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court that separates the procedural functions oblige the judge to seek to 
establish the strict truth by giving him/her a procedural tool – namely, an obligation to be proactive and, at 
the same time, act impartially.   
 
2. Activity does not in itself imply bias, but upon specifying any circumstances that may cause reasonable 
doubt with regard to court bias, it is necessary for participants in proceedings to assess whether the court has 
not exceeded the threshold of bias in performing its duties. This is done on a case-by-case basis by 
individually examining the actions of the judge. 
 
3. The discretion of the court and its power ex officio to act proactively (without the initiative of participants in 
proceedings) are necessary prerequisites for the implementation of not only procedural but also substantive 
justice, and for ensuring a fair decision. To reduce possible misuse of judicial discretion, the law establishes 
factors that limit it and ensure impartiality, including: 
3.1. Imperative procedural rules that precisely specify the form, manner and timing of the court's (or 
judge's) actions, and ensure that procedural justice, at least, is implemented. These are considered to be the 
clearest examples of limitation on the the court's (judge's) discretion. 
3.2. A properly fulfilled obligation to provide the motivation for a judgment is considered not only an 
explanation of the judge's (court's) position on a particular issue, but is one of the guarantees of an individual's 
constitutional rights – which consist of equality before the law, the right to a fair and impartial tribunal, and the 
right to appropriate proceedings.   
3.3. The instance system of courts performs not only the functions of internal control of courts, ensuring the 
reasonableness and legitimacy of judgments, and helping correct errors, but also guarantees the right of a 
participant involved in proceedings to an impartial trial. The establishment of court bias, which serves as 
absolute grounds for invalidity of a verdict, is a violation of criminal proceedings that cannot be corrected by 
a court of higher instance.  
3.4. Only an independent judge can be impartial. The system of guarantees that ensures the independence 
of a judge is thus directly related to also ensuring their impartiality. The elements of this system, such as the 
inviolability of the duration of the judge's mandate, the immunity of the judge's personality, the integrity of the 
judge's person, and guarantees of a social (material) nature for the judge, can be considered not only as 
guarantees of independence, but also of impartiality. 
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